Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, The Federalism in the 21st Century: Historical Perspectives by Kaczorowski, Robert J.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1996
Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National
Sovereignty versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and
in Freedom, The Federalism in the 21st Century:
Historical Perspectives
Robert J. Kaczorowski
Fordham University School of Law, rkaczorowski@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Conflicts of Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons,
Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History, Theory and Process Commons,
Legislation Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, The
Federalism in the 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1015 (1996-1997)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/245
The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in
Freedom
Robert J Kaczorowski°
A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty-
based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's
legislative powers.' Using history as authority, they admonish a return
to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders.2 These "first
principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the
consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."3  Because the people
of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain,
"where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular
power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or
by necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that power and
the states enjoy it.'4 Consequently, "the States can exercise all powers
that the Constitution does not withhold from them."'
These first principles define the national government, on the other
hand, as "'entirely a creature of the Constitution.' 6  Its authority is
therefore limited to those "'few and defined"' powers the Constitution
delegates to it.7 Moreover, even expressly delegated powers, such as the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, must be cabined.
These essential first principles require the courts to limit even further
Congress's expressly delegated powers by interpreting them "as having
judicially enforceable outer limits."'  Constitutional federalism thus
imposes on the Court the-duty of preserving "entire areas of traditional
state concern"9 from national usurpation. This first principle of judicial
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.S.C. Loyola University of
Chicago; M.A., Depaul University; Ph.D., University of Minnesota; J.D., New York University.
1. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 1645 -46 (1995); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1898-1900 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166, 177-180 (1992).
2. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
3. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality
opinion)).
7. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Clinton Rossitered., 1961)).
8. Id. at 1633.
9. Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J. and O'Connor, J., concurring).
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review attributes to the courts the role of active overseer of legislative
policy.' According to this view, the Founders mandated this state
sovereignty theory of federalism "'to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties.""'
Recent scholarship presents a much more complicated picture of the
Founders' first principles, as my colleague Martin Flaherty argues. 2 Jack
Rakove has shown that the essence of "revolutionary constitutionalism"
was "avowedly experimental" in nature.'3 He persuasively argues that the
Founders did not "[lock] into the Constitution at the moment of its
adoption ... a set of definitive meanings."' 4 It also appears that the
Founders did not expect their opinions about the Constitution to control
later interpretations. 5 Larry Kramer shares this view of the Founders'
understanding of the Constitution and argues that the real founding
occurred when the Founders put the ratified Constitution into practice.'
6
David Currie similarly maintains that "[t]he First Congress was practically
a second constitutional convention."' 7  He argues, moreover, that
Congress and executive officials, no less than judges, interpreted the
Constitution and participated in giving the Constitution meaning and
definition in the decades following ratification.' Unquestionably, the
10. See id. at 1629. "'[Wlhether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.' Id. at 1629 n.2 (quoting
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
11. Id. at 1626 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452) (1991)).
12. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 523 (1995); see also INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL
INTENT (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1990).
13. Jack Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 423 (1997).
See also JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996).
14. Rakove, supra note 13, at 422.
15. See RAKOVE, supra note 13, at 343-44.
16. Larry Kramer, Fidelity Through History-and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 512
(1997).
17. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 Nw.
U. L. REv. 606, 606 (1996).
18. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,
1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1994). "Before 1800," he maintains, "nearly all our
constitutional law was made by Congress or the President, and so was much of it thereafter." Id. at
776. Currie quotes Congressman Theodore Sedgwick's 1791 assertion that "'[Tlhe whole business
of Legislation ... was a practical construction of the powers of the Legislature."' Id. at 775 n.1
(citing 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (quoting Gales & Seaton, eds. 1960) (1791)). See also David P.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-
1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161 (1995). Justice William Johnson expressed a similar view
in affirming Congress's contempt powers on a theory of implied inherent powers:
[Vol. 451016
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Constitution created a national government of limited powers. However,
the Founders' understanding of the scope of its powers was far less
limited than the "few and defined" powers the current Court's state
sovereignty plurality asserts.
The Bank of the United States is perhaps the most famous example of
executive and congressional constitution-making of the 1790s. The
question whether Congress possessed the power to incorporate a bank was
thoroughly debated in President George Washington's first administration
by his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, 9 his Attorney General,
Edmund Randolph, and his Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
Hamilton.20 It was also debated in the first Congress of the United States,
which included many of the drafters of the Constitution and those who
played leading roles in its ratification. 2 Interestingly, James Madison
argued in opposition to the bank bill that the Framers specifically rejected
a proposal to give Congress the power of incorporation, but the Framers'
specific intent was not a significant factor in Congress's or the President's
decisions." Congress passed the bank bill and President Washington
signed it into law.
The Supreme Court in 1819 upheld the constitutionality of the
National Bank in one of its most important early decisions, M'Culloch v.
The idea is utopian, that government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion
somewhere. Public security against the abuse of such discretion must rest on
responsibility, and stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived from
the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposite it at the feet of the people,
to be resumed again only at their will, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters
of imagination, but individual liberty can be in little danger ... . The science of
government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed, that can be called a science
which has but few fixed principles, and practically consists in little more than the exercise
of a sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the science
of experiment.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821). Larry Kramer and William E. Nelson
similarly conceive of the Constitution as a dynamically evolving framework of government. Kramer,
supra note 16, at 512, 525, 529; William E. Nelson, Continuity and Change in Constitutional
Adjudication 78 YALE L. J. 500 (1969) (reviewing PAUL EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTrTU'boN (1968)).
19. Opinion on the Consitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, 19 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 279-80 (J. Boyd et al. eds., 1974).
20. See Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 8 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63 (H. Syrett et al. eds., 1965).
21. See Currie, supra note 18, at 777-78; Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM 226-32 (1993); Benjamin B. Klubes, The First Federal Congress and the First National
Bank: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 19
(1990).
22. See RAKOVE, supra note 13, at 359-65; Klubes, supra note 20, at 21, 39-41.
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Maryland.23 The lawyers who argued this case were among the leading
constitutional lawyers of the day and included the Attorneys General of
the United States and of the state of Maryland.24 They argued the issues
on opposing theories of the founding, of federalism, of constitutional
delegation, of the nature and scope of Congress's implied powers, of the
role of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation, and of the very
method of interpreting the Constitution. These arguments elaborated
many of the constitutional arguments and theories Jefferson and Hamilton
had argued to President Washington in 1791.
Like President Washington and Congress, the Court decided in favor
of the bank. In one of the most important opinions written by Chief
Justice John Marshall, the Court unanimously and expressly rejected the
state sovereignty theories argued on behalf of the state of Maryland: its
state compact theory of the founding, its state sovereignty theory of
federalism, its narrow interpretation of constitutional delegation, and its
text-bound theory of constitutional interpretation. The Court unanimously
affirmed the bank's popular sovereignty theory of the founding,25 its dual
23. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). G. Edward White notes that "[t]he
National Intelligencer identified M'Culloch as a 'great case' even before arguments began." See III-
IV G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 238 (1988) (quoting Washington National Intelligencer (Feb. 20, 1819)).
24. WHITE, supra note 23, at 243. The case was so important that the Court permitted each side
to be represented by three lawyers. See id. at 289. The bank's lawyers (M'Culloch was cashier of
the bank's Baltimore branch) included the incomparable Daniel Webster; William Pinckney, who was
characterized by the most eminent contemporary scholar of the Marshall Court as "the most eminent
of the Marshall Court advocates" in 1819; and the United States Attorney General, William Wirt.
Id. Professor White reports that Chief Justice Marshall "called Pinckney 'the greatest man he had
ever seen in a Court of justice,' and [Walter] Jones added that 'no such a man has ever appeared in
any country more than once in a century."' Id. at 244 (quoting TYLER, MEMOIR OF TANEY 141).
Maryland was represented by its attorney general, Luther Martin, one of the few surviving members
of the Constitutional Convention of 1787; Joseph Hopkinson, a frequent advocate before the Supreme
Court who argued Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), with Daniel Webster and
was later appointed to the United States Circuit Court; and Walter Jones, who argued more than 169
cases before the Marshall Court and was destined to become United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 289.
25. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 419. Marshall noted that "the counsel for the State
of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider
that instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent
States." Id. The importance they attached to this view of founding, he noted, is that "[t]he powers
of the general government.. . are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must
be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion." Id. Marshall
expressly rejected this state compact theory of the founding and declared that "the constitution
derives its whole authority . . . directly from the people." Id. at 420. He further stated: "The
government of the Union ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and
in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them, and for their benefit." Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added).
1018 [Vol. 45
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sovereignty theory of federalism,26 its theory of the supremacy of national
sovereignty, 27 its theory of implied inherent powers28 and implied
enumerated powers,29 and its "gloss on the Constitution" '3 approach to
26. See id. at 423. In rejecting Maryland's argument against the bank's constitutionality,
Marshall observed that it was based "[o]n this alone: [t]he power of creating a corporation, is one
appertaining to sovereignty, and is not expressly conferred on Congress." Id.
Conceding that this was true, Marshall dismissed the argument with the observation that "all
legislative powers appertain to sovereignty." Id. He then affirmed the bank's theory of dual
sovereignty, which recognized the national government as a sovereign government with powers
implied from its sovereignty to achieve the objects entrusted by the Constitution to the government
of the United States: "the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union,
and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and
neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other." Id. at 424. Thus, Congress
possessed the sovereign power of incorporation as a power inherent in its sovereignty which it could
use to carry into effect the great objects and vast powers the Constitution conferred on it.
27. See id. at 420. Virtually stating a "first principle" in so many words, Chief Justice Marshall
declared:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect
it would be this: that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result necessarily from its
nature. It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and
acts for all .... But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express
terms, decided it, by saying, "this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which
shall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the land," and by
requiring that the members of the State legislatures, and the officers of the executive and
judicial departments of the States, shall take the oath of fidelity to it.
Id. at 421.
28. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Chief Justice
Marshall articulated as a distinct theory of implied powers those powers that are inherent in the
sovereign nature of the national government which it may exercise to achieve the purposes, ends, and
objectives for which the government of the United States was established, broadly conceived. See
id. at 628.
29. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 422-23. Having affirmed the bank's theory that
Congress possessed the implied power to incorporate as a power inherent in all sovereign
governments, Chief Justice Marshall also asserted that certain other powers are implied from those
specifically enumerated in Article I and in the other constitutional provisions that expressly delegate
legislative power to Congress:
Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word "bank,"
or "incorporation," we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money;
to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and
navies .... [lit may, with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted [sic]
with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of
the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution.
The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution ....
It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of
execution.
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constitutional interpretation which looks to political practice to derive
constitutional meaning.3
30. This theory of constitutional interpretation, which the Court adopted in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion, became a recurring theme in constitutional litigation and practice. See, for
example, its application in fugitive slave cases, supra notes 56-133. Justice Felix Frankfurter's "gloss
on the Constitution" theory of constitutional interpretation is an extension of this approach to
constitutional interpretation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He argued that history and political practice were essential
factors in interpreting the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter, citing M'Culloch as authority for "a
spacious view" of the Constitution, opined:
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way the framework has
consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the
Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the
words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Robert Jackson derived his tripartite
approach to examining the constitutionality of executive powers based on the history of political
practice from the same theory of constitutional interpretation:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even
single Articles tom from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government.
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson offered this approach to constitutional
interpretation as a more realistic alternative to originalism and textualism, which he regarded as futile
methods of defining the scope of governmental powers. See id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Although he was examining the scope of presidential powers, his comments are applicable generally
to constitutional interpretation:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Jo~eph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate
and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations
from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.
And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the
largest questions in the most narrow way.
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
31. Marshall began his analysis of the question whether Congress possessed the power to
incorporate a bank by saying:
It has been truly said that [the bank's constitutionality] can scarcely be considered as an
open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting
it. The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has
been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial
department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418. He conceded that "a bold and daring usurpation might be
resisted, after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than this." Id. at 418-19. However,
Marshall admonished that in a "doubtful question" that does not involve "the great principles of
liberty," but the powers of
the representatives of the people ... ; if not put at rest by the practice of the government,
ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition of the
TRAGIC IRONY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
The Court thus adopted a conception of the Constitution as a
dynamically evolving, power enhancing document whose scope and
meaning was defined through political practice, a malleable instrument
that delegated to Congress the authority to expand its legislative powers
over time to meet unforeseen situations that might confront the nation.32
The Court therefore conceived of the Constitution as an organism whose
substance would evolve over time through the workings of the political
system.
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense
property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly disregarded.
Id. at 419 (emphasis added). He attributed particular importance to the fact that this power "was
exercised by the first congress elected under the present constitution," and that "[ilts principle was
completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability," both in Congress "and
afterwards in the executive cabinet," and, having "convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this
country can boast, it became a law." Id. at 419. He noted that after the original law was allowed
to expire, "a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
government,. . . and induced the passage of the present law." Id. at 419. Marshall concluded that,
"it would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert, that a measure adopted under these
circumstances, was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no countenance." Id.
32. See generally id. Marshall seems to have taken his explanation of his conception of the
Constitution as a dynamically evolving, power-enhancing instrument from James Madison, who
explained in Federalist 44 why the powers conferred on the United States government were not
limited to those expressly delegated in the Constitution, as Article II provided in the Articles of
Confederation. Madison explained:
Had the [constitutional] convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have
involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates;
accommodated too not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes
which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the
particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must
always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object
remains the same.
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 284-85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This is not to
suggest that Madison favored the broad interpretation the Court affirmed in M'Culloch. His theory
of republican government coupled with his fear of legislative tyranny led him to oppose a broad
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause after the Constitution was ratified. See, e.g.,
RAKOVE, supra note 13, at 355. Nevertheless, Marshall certainly intended a broad interpretation:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed
the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have
been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a
legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best
provided for as they occur. To have declared, that the best means shall not be used, but
those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to
deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason,
and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427, It is here that Marshall admonished: "we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding." Id. at 422.
1997] 1021
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Marshall's analysis has been understood as an argument for a broad
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizing Congress
to use "convenient, or useful, or essential" means to carry out its
delegated powers. This exegesis certainly was part of Marshall's
analysis. Overlooked, however, is the more significant meaning of
Marshall's analysis, namely, that he interpreted the Constitution as
authorizing Congress to exercise implied inherent powers to accomplish
the "objects," "ends," and "purposes" for which the national government
was established, in addition to implied enumerated powers. A unanimous
Court, therefore, adopted the broad theory of inherent implied powers of
sovereignty that the bank's lawyers attributed to Congress and which they
argued the Necessary and Proper Clause expressly delegated to
Congress.33 In explaining this inherent sovereign power, Marshall cited
Congress's penal power as an example of an implied inherent power that,
he said, everyone concedes, but "is not among the enumerated powers of
congress."34 He asserted that "the whole penal code of the United States"
is implied from its sovereign powers, except where it is expressly given
33. Marshall explained the Necessary and Proper Clause as an express delegation of implied
powers to Congress:
But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to employ
necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general
reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added that of making "all laws which shall
be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any
department thereof."
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411-12 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18). Like the bank's
attorneys, Marshall distinguished the theory of inherent or incidental powers from the theory of
implied enumerated powers and asserted that the Necessary and Proper Clause expressly conferred
both kinds of implied powers on Congress. See id. at 427. He asserted that "the whole penal code
of the United States" is implied from its sovereign powers, except where it is expressly given:
The good sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of
punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the sovereign has
a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into
execution all sovereign powers, and may be used, although not indispensably necessary.
Id. at 427.
34. Id. at 427. "It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise."
id. at 428, 4 Wheat. at 418; accord Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 233 (1821). Indeed, Marshall
noted that Congress's general power of punishing infractions of its laws "might be denied with the
more plausibility, because it is expressly given in some cases." Id. at 427. Marshall referred to the
express delegation of the powers "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States," and "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and Offenses against the law of nations." Id. at 427 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls.
6, 10). In an opinion written by Justice William Johnson, a unanimous Court rejected the theory that
an express delegation to punish specific offenses "raises an implication against the power to punish
any other," because it would "lead to the annihilation of almost every power of Congress."
Anderson, 19 U.S. at 233. Justice Johnson also noted that Congress's penal powers generally are
"derived from implication." Id.
TRAGIC IRONY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
to punish counterfeiting and treason." He was referring here to
Congress's power to punish counterfeiting and treason.36
Two years after M'Culloch, the Supreme Court upheld Congress's
contempt power on the same theories of implied inherent power and
implied enumerated power. In an opinion written by Justice William
Johnson, the Court unanimously held that Congress's contempt power
derived from its paramount duty to secure "'the safety of the people
[which] is the supreme law,"' 37 and Congress's inherent power of self
defense, to defend itself against "rudeness" and "insult."38  Justice
Johnson also implied Congress's contempt power from its enumerated
powers to punish counterfeiting and treason, which he asserted implicitly
delegated to Congress the power to punish violations of federal law
generally.39
It is significant that these opinions identify the "objects," "purposes,"
and "ends" of the national government, as distinguished from expressly
enumerated powers, as sources of Congress's implied or incidental
powers. They suggest that Congress's implied powers derived not only
from the powers enumerated in Article I. They also derived from the
general purposes identified in the Preamble to the Constitution,40 from
various provisions of other articles of the Constitution, from the
governmental structure created by the Constitution, and from the
sovereign nature of the United States government established by the
Constitution. Moreover, the Court defined for itself a very restricted
scope of judicial review and a deferential role regarding congressional
legislative discretion.
My purpose in examining the national bank and M'Culloch is to
suggest that what I am about to say about the Fugitive Slave Clause4' was
not an aberration, limited to the peculiar institution of slavery. Congress
and the Court applied the same broad theories of constitutional
interpretation to the Fugitive Slave Clause. The legal and constitutional
history of the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the statutes Congress enacted in
35. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 427. Thomas Jefferson argued this very proposition in his Kentucky
Resolution of 1798.
36. See id.
37. Anderson, 19 U.S. at 227.
38. Id at 228-29.
39. See id at 233.
40. The Preamble states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CO NST. pmbl.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2, cl. 3.
1997] 1023
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
1793 and 1850 to implement it, shows that the state and federal judges
who tried cases under these provisions affirmed the same theories of the
Constitution as a power enhancing document based on a national
sovereignty theory of federalism.
The Fugitive Slave Clause states:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
2
This provision recognized an obscure common law property right of
recaption. This right authorized the owner of chattel, such as livestock
and portable goods, that strayed or were taken away, to recover them
through self-help, provided it could be done without a breach of the
peace." In the eighteenth century, this proprietary right also authorized
masters to recapture fugitive servants, fathers to recapture runaway
children, and husbands to recapture absconding wives."
The common law, however, did not recognize a slave owner's right to
recapture a fugitive slave. The apparent reason is that the property right
to slaves was unlike the right to other kinds of property. It did not exist
by natural law, by customary law, or by common law.4" Slavery existed
only by positive law. The slaveowners' property right in their slaves,
including the right of recapture, was thus created by and existed only
under state statutory law.
As northern states abolished slavery while southern states retained it,
two conflicting legal systems emerged in the United States. This troubled
slave holders. The legal effect of any state's law did not go beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. A state that did not recognize slavery was under
42. Id.
43. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW 3-4 (1765-69).
44. See id. This right encompassed an extrajudicial remedy, Sir William Blackstone explained
in his Commentaries on the Common Law:
This happens, when any one hath deprived another of his property in goods or chattels
personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child, or servant: in which case the owner of
the goods, and the husband, parent, or master, may lawfully claim and retake them,
wherever he happens to find them; so it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a
breach of the peace .... If therefore he can so contrive it as to gain possession of his
property again, without force or terror, the law favours and will justify his proceeding.
But, as the public peace is a superior consideration to any one man's private property; ...
it is provided, that this natural right of recaption shall never be exerted, where such
exertion must occasion strife and bodily contention, or endanger the peace of society.
See id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
45. This was Lord Mansfield's holding in Somersetv. Stewart, Loft (G.B.) 1 (1772); 20 Howell
St. Tr. (G.B.) 1 (1772). Jurisdictions in the United States affirmed this principle as authoritative
precedent. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayes, 18 Mass. 193 (1836).
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no obligation to give effect to the master's right in his slave, should
either or both come within the state's jurisdiction. Nor were
nonslaveholding states under any legal obligation to return runaway
slaves to their owners in another state. Under the Articles of
Confederation, then, the recapture of fugitive slaves who escaped from
the state in which they owed labor or service to another state was a
matter of comity among the states. The state to which a slave fled was
free to emancipate her or to return her, as it saw fit.
46
In adopting the Fugitive Slave Clause, therefore, the Founders
expanded an ancient common law right of property to include property
in slaves and elevated it into a new constitutional right that authorized
slaveholders to pursue and to recover their slave property even when their
slaves escaped to a state that did not recognize slavery."' The
significance of the Fugitive Slave Clause is that it conferred on
slaveowners a new constitutional property right enforceable under the
authority of the national government, independent of the states, and the
states were prohibited from interfering with this right.4
In 1793, Congress enacted a statute to enforce this constitutional right.
Like the Bank of the United States, the legislative history of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 involved many of the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution, and it was discussed in Washington's cabinet as well as in
Congress.4 9 At the request of the Washington Administration, Congress
46. See Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229-30 (1847); Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F.
Cas. 1040, 1042 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,501); THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE
PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780-1861, at 15-16 (1974); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 78-79 (1977).
47. See Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 337-39 (C.C Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); Oliver v.
Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657, 659, 661 (C.C.ED. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas.
325, 326 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 11,590); Giltner v. Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 425 (C.C.D. Mich.
1848) (No. 5,453); Driskill v. Parrish, 7 F. Cas. 1100, 1101 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 4,089); Charge
to Grand Jury--Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (D. Mass. 1851) (No. 18,263); Sims's
Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 296-98, 301, 311 (1851); Glen v. Hodges, 9 Johns. 66, 68-69 (N.Y.
1812); Kauffman v. Oliver, 10 Pa. 514, 516 (1849); Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62, 63 (Pa.
1819). See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 17.
48. During the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison acknowledged this when he
explained that the Fugitive Slave Clause "'secures us that property which we now possess. At
present, if any slave elopes to any of those states where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by
their laws .... The fugitive slave clause, he concluded 'was expressly inserted, to enable owners of
slaves to reclaim them."' Quoted in MORRIS, supra note 46, at 19.
49. The problem of fugitive slaves became entwined with the problem of extraditing fugitives
from justice. The governor of Pennsylvania petitioned President Washington to assist with both
problems. Congress dealt with both problems in the 1793 statute. The first two sections provide for
the extradition of fugitives from justice, and the last two sections with the rendition of fugitive slaves.
For a history of the statute, see Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping ofJohn Davis and the Adoption of
the Fugitive Slave Law of1793, 56 J.S. HIST. 397 (1990); William Leslie, A Study in the Origins of
Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver Creek Murders, 57 AM. HIST. REv. 63 (1951).
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exercised plenary power under the Fugitive Slave Clause when it enacted
a statute in 1793 to enforce it.5" Unlike the bank bill, no one questioned
Congress's legislative power,5 even though the constitutional provision
it enforces is in Article IV and not in Article I which enumerates
Congress's legislative powers, and it did not delegate legislative authority
to enforce it even though other sections of Article IV do expressly
delegate power to Congress to enforce them. 2
In addition to prescribing a summary process for the rendition of
fugitive slaves in which the alleged runaway had no rights to defend
herself, 3 this 1793 statute conferred on slaveholders two remarkable
remedies against anyone who knowingly interfered with the owners'
recapture of a fugitive slave or assisted in her escape. The first was a
"penalty" of five hundred dollars recoverable by the claimant or his agent
in an action of debt.54 This "punishment" was actually a private right of
action for a civil fine.55 Even more remarkable was the second remedy:
a tort action for damages.56 This federal statute, enacted in consultation
with President Washington, Secretary of State Jefferson, and Attorney
General Randolph just four years after the ratification of the United States
Constitution by a Congress comprised of many of its Framers and
ratifiers, provided for private parties to enforce their constitutionally
secured property right through private causes of action! It presents
important evidence not only of the Founders' conception of constitutional
rights, but of their understanding of the scope of congressional powers to
enforce them. Moreover, the 1793 statute is a significant example of
constitution-making by executive and legislative branches of the
50. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
51. Significantly, there seems to be no evidence that any of the parties involved with the
adoption of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 questioned Congress's power to enact it. Even Professor
Paul Finkelman, who recently fervently argued that the Founders did not intend to delegate legislative
authority to Congress to implement the Fugitive Slave Clause, does not offer any evidence that any
of the participants even raised a question concerning Congress's authority to enact the statute. On
the contrary, in an earlier article he wrote that, after Congress enacted the bill and sent it to President
Washington, "[wlithout any hesitation, President Washington signed this bill into law." Paul
Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L. J. 605, 621 (1993). Finkelman
discusses the enactment of the 1793 Act in Finkelman, supra note 49. He argues that the founders
did not intend to delegate legislative power to Congress in Story Telling on the Supreme Court:
Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 247,259-
63 (1994).
52. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, §§ 3, 4.
53. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3; 1 Stat. 302, 302-03.
54. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 4; I Stat. 302, 305.
55. Steams v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188, 1192 (C.C. 1827-1840) (No. 13,341) (private
actions for penalties are civil actions).
56. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 4, I Stat. 302, 305.
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government, and it constituted the exercise of a federal police power that
overrode the police powers of the states, as we shall see.
Slave owners and their agents enforced their constitutionally secured
right of recaption in private lawsuits which they brought under the 1793
Fugitive Slave Act in federal and state courts." Slaveowners and their
agents brought many civil suits under the 1793 statute, and they
succeeded in recovering the civil fine and tort damages more often than
they failed."
State and federal judges universally enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793. In contrast to the judicial activism of the current Supreme Court's
state sovereignty plurality in setting aside acts of Congress which they
conclude violate principles of federalism and state sovereignty,"
antebellum state and federal judges felt obligated to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, notwithstanding their
57. The best legal histories of fugitive slave recaption and the reaction of the nonslaveholding
states are STANLEY CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE
LAW, 1850-1860 (1970); ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
(1981); MORRIS, supra note 46. However, these histories focus on the recaption provision and ignore
the civil actions of debt and tort.
58. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 1115, 1118 (C.C.D. Ind. 1845) (No. 16,903)
(verdict for defendant); Jones v. VanZandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1046 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,504)
(verdict for plaintiff for $1200) aff'd 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847); Stearns, 22 F. Cas. at 1192
(verdict for plaintiff for $500 penalty reversed for error in jury charge); Hill v. Low, 12 F. Cas. 172,
174 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 6,494) (verdict for plaintiff for $500 penalty reversed for error injury
charge and new trial ordered). For tort actions, see, e.g., Driskill v. Parish, 7 F. Cas. 1068, 1068-69
(C.C.D. Ohio 1851) (No. 4,075) (per diem and travel expense costs retaxed from defendant to
plaintiff for witness who was not summoned, but appeared voluntarily); Driskill v. Parish, 7 F. Cas.
1069, 1069 (C.C.D. Ohio 1851) (No. 4,076) (per diem and travel expense costs retaxed from
defendant to plaintiff for two witnesses who were not summoned, but appeared voluntarily); Oliver
v. Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657, 664 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497) (action on the case for harboring
and concealing fugitive slaves, jury disagreed); retried as Oliver v. Weakley, 18 F. Cas. 678, 679 (3d
Cir. 1853) (No. 10,502) (verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2800); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas.
325, 329 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 11,590) (verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $1500); Giltner v.
Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 433 (C.C.D. Mich. 1848) (No. 5,453) (verdict and judgment for plaintiff
for $2,752); Driskill v. Parrish, 7 F. Cas. 1100, 1104 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 4,089) (jury could
not agree); retried as Driskell v. Parish, 7 F. Cas. 1095, 1100 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 4,088)
(verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $500, "the proved value of slaves in question"); Jones, 13 F.
Cas. at 1042 (verdict for plaintiff of $1200); Worthington v. Preston, 30 F. Cas. 645, 647 (C.C.E.D.
Pa 1824) (No. 18,055) (jailor not liable for fugitive slave's escape if he was not negligent); Daggs
v. Frazer, 6 F. Cas. 1112, 1113-14 (D. Ia. 1849) (No. 3,538) (action of trover will not lie in Iowa
to recover the value of slaves); Glen v. Hodges, 9 Johns. 66, 70 (N.Y. 1812) (action of trespass vi
et armis by slave owner under 1793 Fugitive Slave Act affirmed and new trial ordered); Kauffman
v. Oliver, 10 Pa. 514, 518 1849 (an action at common law does not lie for harboring runaway slaves
or for aiding in their escape,.and state courts do not have jurisdiction under the 1793 Act to try such
cases; plaintiff amended his declaration and the cause continued at the costs of the plaintiff).
59. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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personal abhorrence to slavery and the existence of conflicting state law.6°
Federal and state appellate judges generally asserted that the
constitutional recognition of the slaveholder's right to recapture runaway
slaves inherently delegated legislative power to Congress to enforce the
right. When judges did not expressly assert this theory, they simply
assumed it. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, every state
and federal court that decided the question of the 1793 Fugitive Slave
Act's constitutionality upheld it.6 Moreover, they universally concluded
that the Supremacy Clause required them to enforce this federal
constitutionally and statutorily secured property right over any state
constitutional, statutory, or common law to the contrary. State and
federal judges were deferential to Congress, not only recognizing its
power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause, but also in refusing to decide
on the justice, fairness, and policy considerations of the legislation.62
Judges also admonished jurors faithfully to perform their legal duty
under the Fugitive Slave Act even though they might find the statute
morally repulsive. For example, in 1833 United States Supreme Court
Justice Henry Baldwin, as circuit justice, instructed a federal jury in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to set aside their personal feelings about
slavery and to vindicate the "personal rights which are made inviolable
under the protection" of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave
60. See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (D. Mass.
1851) (No. 18,263); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 851, 855 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No.
7,416); Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 11, 18 (1823); Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. &
Rawle 62, 63 (Pa. 1819).
61. As late as 1853 Supreme Court Justice John McLean observed that not a single judge or
court had held the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional. Justice McLean asserted:
The act of 1793 has been in operation about sixty years. During that whole time it has
been executed as occasion required, and it is not known that any court, judge, or other
officer has held the act, in this [summary process to determine right to remove alleged
fugitive slave], or in any other respect, unconstitutional.
Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 340 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583).
62. For example, Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Isaac Parker noted that the people
of Massachusetts were especially troubled that the 1793 statute gave slaveowners the legal power to
seize an alleged fugitive slave without judicial process. Nevertheless, he declared that he was
constrained by his judicial function to dismiss this concern, commenting that "[w]hether the statute
is a harsh one, is not for us to determine." Griffith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) at 18. See also In re Martin,
16 F. Cas. 881, 884 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1827-1840)(No. 9,154); Johnson 13 F. Cas. at 851; In re Susan,
23 F. Cas. 444, 445 (C.C.D. Ind. 1818) (No. 13,632); Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311, 321 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1834), aff'd on other grounds, Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507 (N.Y. 1835); Glen, 9 Johns. at 69;
Wright, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 63. The United States Supreme Court upheld Congress's legislative
authority to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause in the first constitutional challenge it decided. Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 568 (1842). Justice Story acknowledged that state courts
universally upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. See id. at 567.
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Act of 1793.63 The jury did its duty and returned a verdict of $4,000 for
the false arrest of slave catchers who sued a justice of the peace, a local
constable, and private citizens of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania."
Consequently, when litigants challenged the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act, they did not ordinarily question Congress's authority
to legislate to implement the Fugitive Slave Clause.6 Rather, when they
attacked the statute, they argued that it violated the alleged fugitive
slave's Bill of Rights guarantees or her rights under state legal process.66
However, the fact that blacks were unable to defend themselves at
summary fugitive slave hearings by testifying or entering evidence in
their behalf gave rise to the practice of kidnapping blacks and selling
them into slavery.67 Several free states responded to this practice in the
early decades of the nineteenth century by enacting antikidnapping or
personal liberty statutes that attempted to repeal the federal right of self-
help recaption and to provide some procedural protections to the alleged
fugitive slave before the magistrate could issue a certificate of removal.68
Moreover, these antikidnapping statutes also imposed heavy penalties
against anyone who illegally seized a person with the intention of
enslaving her or of selling her into slavery.6" If a claimant exercised his
federally secured right to self-help recaption and seized an alleged
runaway slave under the 1793 Act, without a warrant from a local
magistrate or a federal judge, he could be prosecuted as a kidnapper
under state law.70 Designed to protect the personal liberty of free Blacks,
these personal liberty laws interposed state legal process between the
national government and individuals claiming rights under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Thus, federal constitutional
63. Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at 855. See also Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. at 1016-17 (jurors
must enforce the law even though they find it morally repugnant).
64. Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at 855.
65. For an exception see In re Susan, 23 F. Cas. at 445.
66. See, e.g., Wright, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 63 (defendant argues that the Fugitive Slave Act is
unconstitutional because it denies him the right to jury trial guaranteed by the United States and
Pennsylvania constitutions); Griffith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) at 14-15 (Massachusetts attorney general
argues that the Fugitive Slave Act is unconstitutional because it violates the alleged fugitive slave's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures); In re Martin, 16 F. Cas. at 883 (defendant
argues that the 1793 Act is unconstitutional because it deprives him of Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial).
67. See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 23-34.
68. See id. at 27-29. Some statutes also required a jury trial to determine the status of an
alleged fugitive slave. See id. at 83. Although the fugitive slave was not permitted to testify on her
own behalf, she was nonetheless permitted to enter evidence relating to her status. Id. at 51-53.
69. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania 1826 Antikidnapping Law. The best account of these statutes
is, MORRIS, supra note 46, at 27-29.
70. However, Justice Baldwin affirmed the claimants' right of self-help in Johnson v. Tompkins,
13 F. Cas. 840, 851 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416).
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and statutory rights directly conflicted with the traditional state police
power and function of protecting the personal safety and the personal
liberty of its citizens and inhabitants. Recognizing that these state statutes
and judges posed serious deterrents to the recapture of fugitive slaves,
proslavery Southerners turned to the United States Supreme Court to
resolve the resulting conflicts between state and federal law and the
impending crisis in American federalism.7
The states of Maryland and Pennsylvania contrived a test case which
afforded the Court the opportunity to resolve the conflicting theories of
federalism in 1842.72 It is cited in Prigg v. Pennsylvania." The specific
issue presented to the Court was the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
Personal Liberty Law of 1826."4 The Court unanimously held that the
71. See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 94.
72. See Id. at 94-95; V CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE TANEY
PERIOD, 1836-64, at 436 (1974). Edward Prigg and others, acting as agents of a Maryland
slaveowner, secured from a local justice of the peace in Pennsylvania a warrant for the arrest of
certain fugitive slaves. They seized the runaways under authority of this warrant and presented them
to the justice of the peace who had issued the warrant. However, he refused to hold a hearing or to
issue a certificate of removal as required by federal statute which would have authorized the fugitive
slaves' removal from Pennsylvania to Maryland. The agents simply returned the slaves to their
owner in Maryland. The agents were subsequently indicted and charged with kidnapping by a
Pennsylvania grand jury under an 1826 Pennsylvania antikidnapping statute. The Pennsylvania
governor applied to the governor of Maryland to extradite the accused kidnappers, but was refused.
Instead, the Maryland governor referred the matter to the state legislature which passed resolutions
declaring that the right or recaption was guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States
and could not be abridged by the states. After a commissioner sent by Maryland to Pennsylvania
failed to obtain a dismissal of the indictments and modifications to the Pennsylvania antikidnapping
statute, the Maryland and Pennsylvania legislatures sought to have an expedited hearing brought
before the United States Supreme Court to resolve the issues in dispute. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). Carl Swisher reports that "the Pennsylvania legislature arranged for
a trial at which by special verdict Edward Prigg, one of the captors, would be found guilty and the
case, challenging the constitutionality of the 1826 statute, would be handled in such a way that it
could be taken to the Supreme Court." SWISHER, supra, at 436. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Story acknowledged the origin of this suit by agreement between the states. He stated that, before
he addressed
the very important and interesting questions involved in this record, it is fit to say, that
the cause has been conducted in the Court below, and has been brought here by the co-
operation and sanction, both of the state of Maryland, and the state of Pennsylvania, in
the most friendly and courteous spirit, with a view to have those questions finally
disposed of by the adjudication of this Court; so that the agitations on this subject in both
states, which have had a tendency to interrupt the harmony between them, may subside,
and the conflict of opinion be put at rest.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 609. Justice McClean was even more explicit. Asserting that the decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "was pro forma," he added: "Indeed, I suppose, the case has
been made up merely to bring the question before this Court." Id. at 673 (McLean, J., concurring);
see also id. at 659.
73. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
74. See id at 558.
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Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional." It also unanimously held the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional in every respect save one. 6
The constitutional infirmity of the 1793 statute was the jurisdiction
Congress attempted to confer on state magistrates.7 All but three of the
Justices held that Congress's power under the Fugitive Slave Clause was
exclusive and that Congress could enforce constitutional rights and federal
statutes only through federal courts.78  The three dissenters, although
concurring in the judgment of the Court and its theories of constitutional
rights and congressional powers in other respects, insisted that the states
possessed concurrent jurisdiction to enforce this constitutional right. 9
Justice Joseph Story wrote the opinion for the Court." Story's opinion
reaffirmed and attributed to the Founders the conception of the
Constitution as a dynamically evolving, power-enhancing framework of
government whose meaning was largely defined by political practice.8"
Judges should therefore interpret the Constitution "in such a manner, as,
consistently with the words, shall fully and completely effectuate the
whole objects of it."82 As a general rule of interpretation, Story opined,
"[n]o Court of justice can be authorized so to construe any clause of the
Constitution as to defeat its obvious ends, when another construction,
equally accordant with the words and sense thereof, will enforce and
75. See id. at 625-26.
76. See id. at 596-601.
77. See id. at 598.
78. Justice James M. Wayne summarized the holding of the Court and the positions of the
Justices on certain key points: All of the Justices agreed that the Pennsylvania statute was
unconstitutional; that the Fugitive Slave Clause "was a compromise between the slaveholding, and
the non-slaveholding states, to secure to the former fugitive slaves as property." Id. at 637 (Wayne,
J., concurring). Wayne concluded that there was no disagreement "among the judges as to the
reversal of the judgment; none in respect to the origin and object of the provision, or the obligation
to exercise it." Id. (Wayne, J., concurring). The disagreement that did exist among the Justices,
Wayne explained, related "to the mode of execution." Id. (Wayne, J., concurring). Three Justices
insisted that the states could "legislate upon the [Fugitive Slave Clause], in aid of the object it was
intended to secure; and that such legislation is constitutional, when it does not conflict with the
remedy which Congress may enact." Id. at 637-38 (Wayne, J., concurring). Justice Wayne's
summary reveals the positions taken by the silent Justices on critical issues. The Court was
unanimous regarding the nature of the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fugitive Slave Clause,
and that this guarantee delegated plenary legislative authority to Congress to protect and enforce the
rights thus guaranteed. See id. at 636-38 (Wayne, J., concurring).
79. The three Justices were Chief Justice Taney, Justice Thompson, and Justice Daniel. See id.
at 626 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id. at 633 (Thompson, J., dissenting); id. at 650 (Daniel, J.,
dissenting).
80. See id. at 608. But six of his brethren filed concurring and dissenting opinions. See id. at
626-74.
81. See id. at 606-26.
82. Id. at 612.
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protect them." 3 The Court's deference to the law-making decisions of
the people's representatives was the judicial norm, whether the decisions
were made by a constituent assembly or a legislative assembly.
Story therefore broadly interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause as
containing two fundamental guarantees.8 The first constitutional
guarantee prohibited the states from freeing fugitive slaves.8 5
Significantly, Story interpreted this prohibition against state action as an
affirmative recognition of "a positive and absolute right." 6 Thus, the
Court unanimously held that the Constitution nationalized the
slaveowner's property right to his slave. 7
The Fugitive Slave Clause contains a second provision which requires
that the fugitive slave "shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom such Service or Labour may be due."88 Story interpreted these two
provisions as a constitutional guarantee of the slave owners' property
83. Id.
84. See id. at 611.
85. The first part of the Fugitive Slave Clause states: "No person held to Service or Labour
in one State under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see
also Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611. Story explained the obvious and literal meaning of this
language: "The slave is not to be discharged from service or labour, in consequence of any state law
or regulation." Id at 612.
86. Id. at 613. Story declared: "The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive,
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any
way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain." Id. at 612.
87. See id. at 613. Story noted that it "puts the right to the service or labour upon the same
ground and to the same extent in every other state as in the state from which the slave escaped, and
in which he was held to the service and labour." Id "If this be so," Story concluded, "then all the
incidents to that right attach also." Id. at 613. Story identified the common law origin of this
constitutionally secured right of slave recaption:
[T]his is no more than a mere affirmance of the principles of the common law applicable
to this very subject. Mr. Justice Blackstone (3 BI. Comm. 4) lays it down as
unquestionable doctrine. "Recaption or reprisal (says he) is another species of remedy by
the mere act of the party injured. This happens when any one hath deprived another of
his property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child, or
servant; in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or master may
lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them, so it be not in a
riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.
Id. Story asserted that this common law property right had been elevated to a federally enforceable
constitutional right.
Upon this ground we have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue
of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in
the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of
the peace, or any illegal violence.
Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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right which delegated to Congress plenary power to enforce it.89 Story
declared: "If, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right, and if it
requires the delivery upon the claim of the owner, (as cannot well be
doubted,) the natural inference certainly is, that the national government
is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. ''9O
Story reaffirmed M'Culloch's theory of powers implied from the ends for
which the national government was established as distinguished from
powers implied from those enumerated in Article I and other
constitutional provisions, stating:
The fundamental principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to
be, that where the end is required, the means are given; and where the duty is
enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the
functionaries to whom it is entrusted.9
Story supported his interpretation of the Constitution's text by attributing
it to the Founders.92
He also relied on the political practice of the Founders who enacted the
1793 statute and of the federal and state judges and other governmental
89. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615. This language, Story observed, "contemplated some
farther remedial redress than that, which might be administered at the hands of the owner himself."
Id. This remedial assistance must come from the United States government. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 62 1. Story cited the Founders' understanding and political practice to support his
reading of the rights and legislative powers implicit in the Constitution's text. See id. He attributed
his interpretation of the Constitution's text and "this very view of the power and duty of the national
government" to the Founders and the congressional framers of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. See id
at 616. The framers of the statute had a "vast influence" on the question of its constitutionality, Story
observed, for many of the congressional framers of the Act and President George Washington, who
initiated its legislative adoption and signed it into law, were also framers of the Constitution or were
"intimately connected with its adoption." Id. at 621. Justice Story noted that:
It was passed only four years after the adoption of the Constitution. In that Congress
were many of the leading and most distinguished men of the convention. The act was not
passed hastily; for it was reported in 1791, and finally acted on in 1793. It was not
passed without full consideration; for the Virginia case, and the different opinions, looking
to federal or state legislation upon a kindred subject, were communicated to Congress in
1791. Here, then, is a contemporaneous exposition of the constitutional provision in the
act itself, which has been always regarded by this Court as of very high authority. A
practical exposition, which, in the language of a distinguished commentator, approaches
nearest to a judicial exposition.
Id. at 566. The distinguished commentator to whom Story referred was none other than himself.
His citation was to "I STORY'S COMM. ON THE CONST. 392." But, Story also cited the Supreme
Court's decisions in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) and Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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officers who universally accepted and acted upon it and considered it "a
binding and valid law."93
A majority of the Court held that Congress's power to enforce the
slaveholders' constitutional right was exclusive. The Court held that
Congress's power was exclusive for several reasons that evince the
Court's view of a national sovereignty based theory of federalism. First,
the right of recaption was an absolute and positive right enforceable
throughout the United States independent of the states.94 Second, this
right was a new right created by the Constitution and beyond state
jurisdiction."' Justice Story reasoned that "[tihe natural inference
deducible from this consideration certainly is, in the absence of any
positive delegation of power to the state legislatures, that it belongs to the
legislative department of the national government, to which it owes its
origin and establishment." '96 Consequently, Congress could enforce
federal rights and duties only through federal agencies.
Although the Court's decision in Prigg affirmed in principle the
constitutional and federally secured right of slave owners, by restricting
the duty of enforcement to federal institutions the Court largely
93. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 621. Nevertheless, "independent of the vast influence," which "a
contemporaneous exposition of the provisions [of the Constitution] by those, who were its immediate
framers, or intimately connected with its adoption" should have in constitutional interpretation, Story,
like Marshall, Johnson, and other state appellate and federal judges, assumed political practice defined
the Constitution. Id. Indeed, Story cited Supreme Court precedents in support of this method of
constitutional interpretation. See id. Citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, Martin, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803), Story declared: "Especially did this
Court in [these cases] rely upon contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution, and long
acquiescence in it, with great confidence, in the discussion of questions of a highly interesting and
important nature." Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 621. He noted that Congress had acted on a "rule of
interpretation" which assumed the Constitution delegated "the right as well as the duty" to Congress
to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves. Id. at 620. He also noted that all of the provisions of
the 1793 statute had been universally accepted and acted upon by judges and other governmental
officials who "uniformly recognized [it] as a binding and valid law." Id at 621. Story thus invoked
political practice as a theory of constitutional interpretation.
[I]f the question were one of doubtful construction, such long acquiescence in it, such
contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and uniform recognition of its
validity, would in our judgment entitle the question to be considered at rest; ....
Congress, the executive, and the judiciary have, upon various occasions, acted upon this
as a sound and reasonable doctrine.
Id. However, Story quickly added that the Court did not consider the constitutionality of the 1793
Act to be a doubtful question. See id. at 622.
94. See id. at 623. Story stated: "Under the Constitution it is recognized as an absolute,
positive, right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme force, uncontrolled
and uncontrollable by state sovereignty or state legislation." Id.
95. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 623. Story explained: "It is, therefore, in ajust sense a new
and positive right, independent of comity, confined to no territorial limits, and bounded by no state
institutions or policy." Id
96. Id
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undermined in practice the ability of slaveowners to enforce their right.
Northern free states interpreted Prigg as a license to refuse to assist
slaveowners in recapturing their slaves.97 They enacted new personal
liberty laws to enforce the due process rights of alleged fugitive slaves
and prohibited state officials from assisting their recapture in any way.98
These actions added to an increasing pattern of lawlessness in which
groups hostile to slavery interfered with the recapture of fugitive slaves
and aided in their escape. In nullifying state authority to aid in
recapturing runaway slaves, the Prigg decision encouraged the
organization of groups to assist runaways' escape to freedom. Prigg thus
contributed to growing sectional conflict.99
Northern resistance led to Southern demands for a more effective
federal statute. Congress complied in 1850. As in 1793, Congress in
1850 enacted legislation to enforce the constitutional right of slaveholders
and to obviate the conflicts between the slave and free states.'00 The
Fugitive Slave Act of 185001 represented an even more remarkable
exercise of national authority to enforce constitutional rights than its 1793
counterpart. Congress authorized federal judges to appoint commissioners
with "the powers that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of any
97. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Oliver, 10 Barr 514 (Pa. 1849) where the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held there was no common law action for the recaption of slaves who escaped to Pennsylvania
from another state; that Pennsylvania state courts "are interdicted from assuming a voluntary
jurisdiction" in such cases, id. at 519; "that an action of this kind can only be sustained under the
act of Congress of 1793; that our state courts have not jurisdiction of an action under the statute; and
the principles of the common law do not sustain any such action in this state." Id. Echoing the
Supreme Court's opinion in Prigg, the court also asserted that:
Congress has power to pass all laws necessary to make the claim efficacious and
commensurate with the constitutional provision. But it must be done through the
court over which Congress have power, and through their instrumentality; otherwise,
the claim might be rendered abortive by the decisions of the state courts, pursuing
their own local policy .... The provisions of the act of Congress must be pursued
in the tribunals of the United States. There they meet with no warfare by local
legislation, or municipal peculiarities. And the person claiming the services of the
fugitive is in the forum of that sovereignty and jurisdiction under which his claim is
made.
Id. at 517. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Cecilia Oliver's common law
action for damages against Daniel Kauffman and others for assisting certain of her slaves to escape,
she and members of her family sued in federal court under section four of the 1793 Act. The first
suit ended in a hung jury. See Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No.
10,497). Their second suit resulted in ajury verdict awarding them $2,800 in damages. See Oliver
v. Weakley, 18 F. Cas. 678 (3d Cir. 1853) (No. 10,502).
98. See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 114-23; SwisHER, supra note 72, at 545.
99. See SWISHER, supra note 72, at 546-48. Indeed, Lincoln's biographer, Albert J. Beveridge,
considered the Prigg case as one of the most important decided by the Supreme Court in this regard.
See I11 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1809-1858 67, 67 n.4 (1928).
100. See MORRIs, supra note 46, at 130-47.
101. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. X, 9 Stat. 462 [hereinafter Fugitive Slave Act of 1850].
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of the United States" had to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders of any
crime against the United States. It gave these commissioners
concurrent jurisdiction with federal circuit, district, and territorial court
judges to grant certificates of removal to claimants of fugitive slaves
"upon satisfactory proof being made."'0 3 A scholar early in this century
correctly analogized this enforcement structure to federal administrative
commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and boards
of immigrant inspectors.
0 4
Moreover, the 1850 statute imposed upon federal legal officers the duty
to enforce its provisions under penalty of heavy fines of $1,000 payable
to the slave owner.' Should the fugitive slave escape from the custody
of federal officials, they were made liable for the full value of the
slave.0 6 The statute also imposed on private citizens the duty to enforce
the slaveholder's constitutional and statutory rights. It authorized
commissioners to call a posse comitatus and commanded "all good
citizens" to assist in the execution of the statute whenever their aid was
required.'
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 combined the right of self-help
recapture with compulsory federal summary legal process.'0 8 It expressly
prohibited the alleged fugitive slave from entering evidence on her behalf,
and it expressly provided that the certificate of removal shall be
conclusive of the right of the claimant or his agent to remove the fugitive
to the state from which she escaped."9 It expressly invoked the
Supremacy Clause"0 by making the certificate an absolute bar to "any
102. Id. at § 1.
103. Id. at § 4.
104. Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L.J. 161, 181-182
(1921); see also, MORIUS, supra note 46, at 132 ("The primary purpose of the bill was to increase
the number of officials involved in adjudicating claims under the federal law by spreading the
responsibility to nonjudicial officers, such as postmasters and collectors of customs.").
105. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 §§ 1, 5.
106. Id. at § 5.
107. Id.
108. Id. at § 6. The statute authorized slave owners and their agents to reclaim runaway slaves
either by warrant issued by a federal judge or commissioner or by seizing the fugitive without legal
process and bringing her before a federal judge or commissioner "whose duty it shall be to hear and
determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner," and, on "satisfactory proof being made,"
to issue a certificate authorizing the claimant or his agent to remove the slave with "such reasonable
force and restraint as may be neccessary [sic]" back to the state in which she owed service.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
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process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person
whomsoever.""...
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 superseded the civil penalty provided
in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 with criminal penalties for knowingly
and willingly violating the statute. On conviction, the defendant was
subject to a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to six
months." 2 This provision doubled the amount of the civil penalty
recoverable under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Violators were also
subject to "civil damages" in the amount of $1,000 for each fugitive slave
lost, payable to the owner." 3 The statutory "civil damages" of $1,000 in
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act benefitted slaveholders, since it was greater
than the damages awarded in tort actions under the 1793 Fugitive Slave
Act.'" The courts interpreted these damages as a tort remedy that
claimants might seek as an alternative to the tort action provided in the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.'
The fee structure provided in the 1850 Act also appeared to favor
slaveowners. The fees of federal marshals, deputy marshals, and court
clerks in fugitive slave cases were set at $10 if a certificate of removal
I 1. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 6. The only concession to state powers Congress included
in this Act was a provision permitting as conclusive evidence of the identity and service owed by the
alleged fugitive "satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate, justice
of the peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath and take depositions under the
laws of the State or Territory, from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped,"
with a certificate of the authority of the officer and the seal of the proper state court or officer. Id.
The last section of the statute elaborated the state process permitted as conclusive evidence of the fact
of escape and the service owed to the claimant as "satisfactory proof' recorded in a court transcript
authenticated by the clerk and court seal. Id. at § 10. The claimant or his agent could present this
record to a federal officer in any state or territory in which the slave had escaped, and, being
conclusive evidence, the federal officer was obliged to issue the certificate of removal. Id.
112. Id. at § 7.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Oliver v. Weakley, 18 F. Cas. 678, 679 (3d. Cir. 1853) (No. 10,502) (damages
of $2,800 awarded for twelve escaped slaves, two husbands, two wives and eight children); Jones
v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843-51) (Nos. 7501-7505) (value of escaped slave was
fixed at $600); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas. 325, 329 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 11,590) (damages of
$1,500 awarded for one adult woman slave and her four children); Driskill v. Parish, 7 F. Cas. 1095,
1100 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 4,088) (value of two escaped slaves fixed at $500); Giltner v.
Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 427 (C.C.D. Mi. 1848) (No. 5,453) (value of six escaped slaves fixed at
$2,752).
115. Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429, 440 (1851). Justice Grier held that the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 did not repeal the tort action of compensatory damages under the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793. Indeed, he declared that "[i]n case of a rescue of a captured fugitive, or of an illegal
interference to hinder such recapture, when the master had it in his power to effect it, the defendant
would be liable, not only to the penalty, but also to pay the full value of the slave thus rescued, and
even punitive or exemplary damages, as in other actions for a tort." Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F. Cas.
657, 660 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497).
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was issued and only $5 if the certificate was denied." 6 However, the
federal officer who executed process was entitled to a fee of $5 and any
other necessary costs incurred, such as food and lodging during the
fugitive slave's detention, which were to be paid by the claimant. Should
the return of fugitive slaves be met with local resistance in a free state,
Congress provided for the removal of the fugitive by federal force at
federal expense." 7
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, although part of the famous
Compromise of 1850 intended by Henry Clay and Daniel Webster to ease
sectional feelings over slavery, actually heightened those tensions. The
summary process culminating in the certificate of removal of the alleged
fugitive slave became the focus of antislavery political opposition in the
North." 8 The denial of the right to a jury trial, the right of the accused
to testify in his own behalf, and the right to habeas corpus combined
with the summary nature of the proceeding based exclusively on the
claimant's evidence relating to the alleged fugitive's status, effectively
prevented the free states' presumption of freedom and other personal
liberty guarantees from interfering with the slaveholder's right of
recaption. Moreover, the disparity in fees appeared to abolitionists and
antislavery sympathizers as a bribe to ensure that the commissioner or
judge would issue the certificate of removal." 9 Abolitionists, such as
Wendell Phillips, urged Northerners to resist and disobey the statute. 20
Even more moderate antislavery societies declared that moral and
religious people could not obey such an immoral and irreligious law.'
116. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 8.
117. Id. at § 9. However, on mere affidavit by the claimant or his agent that he had reason to
believe that a rescue would be attempted by force before he could return the fugitive to the state from
which she fled, the federal officer who made the initial arrest was required to retain as many persons
as necessary to overcome such force and to return the fugitive to the claimant in the state from which
the fugitive slave escaped. See id. The fees and costs of this process were to be paid out of the
United States Treasury.
118. See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 137-38. Professor Allen Johnson of Yale Law School
observed decades ago that contemporary critics of the 1850 Act focused their criticisms on three
points: the failure of the accused to testify in her own defense; the summary procedure or absence
of ajury trial; and the denial of the privilege of habeas corpus. He also quoted additional criticisms
of Charles Sumner which included the cx parte evidence, the absence of cross-examination, the denial
of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, the denial of the
Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law, the exercise of Article Ill judicial powers by
commissioners, and the "bribe" of a double fee to the commissioners for issuing the certificate of
removal. See Johnson, supra note 104, at 171-73.
119. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 80 (1988).
120. Id. at 82.
121. Id. at 82-86.
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Northerners did resist federal legal process with varying degrees of
force and violence.' Presidents Millard Fillmore in 1851 and Franklin
Pierce in 1854 personally intervened with federal force against mobs that
attempted to rescue fugitive slaves who were held in federal custody. 2
The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the open warfare instigated by John
Brown in -Kansas, and the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision
12 4
produced a fierce Northern backlash. By the middle of the 1850s, many
Northern state legislatures and judiciaries interposed their police powers
to nullify the Fugitive Slave Acts. 2'
Wisconsin presented the most notorious example of state interposition,
for the state's executive, legislative, and judicial branches joined its
citizens in strenuous efforts to nullify federal law.' Indeed, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected precedents of the United States
Supreme Court and lower federal courts 27 and declared the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 unconstitutional; it issued writs of habeas corpus
directing a federal marshal to release defendants arrested under the statute
122. See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1015 (D.C. Mass. 1851)
(No. 18,263); Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851); Sims's Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
285 (1851); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 217-
221 (1975); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 89-
97 (1957); MCPHERSON, supra note 119, at 80-91; MORRIS, supra note 46, at 151-85.
123. See LEVY, supra note 122, at 89-90; MCPHERSON, supra note 119, at 82-83, 104-05;
MORRIS, supra note 46, at 166. Professor McPherson recounts that federal marshals appealed to
President Franklin Pierce for help in returning fugitive slave Anthony Bums from Boston to Virginia
when his capture in Boston triggered riots in which a man was killed in an assault on the courthouse
where Bums was being held. President Pierce sent several companies of marines, cavalry, and
artillery to Boston, and admonished federal officers to spare no expense to ensure that federal law
was enforced. They were joined by Massachusetts militia and Boston police in an effort to keep the
peace. This single incident, McPherson concludes, cost the government $100,000, which is "equal
to perhaps two million in 1987 dollars." MCPHERSON, supra note 118, at 120.
124. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
125. The New England states and the states of Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin enacted Personal
Liberty Laws in the years 1854 through 1861 designed to undermine the Fugitive Slave Acts.
MORRIS, supra note 46, at 166-68, 219-22.
126. See, SWISHER, supra note 72, at 654-56; Vroman Mason, The Fugitive Slave Law In
Wisconsin, With Reference to Nullification Sentiment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE HISTORICAL
SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN 117 (1896).
127. The United States Supreme Court analyzed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in Norris v.
Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851). It did not formally decide its constitutionality because that
question was not before it. However, the Court's discussion assumed the Act's constitutionality. For
related opinions of the lower federal courts, see Miller v. McQuerry, 34 F. Cas. 335 (C.C. Ohio
1853) (No. 9,583); Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Act, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851)
(No. 18,261); United States v. Scott, 27 F. Cas. 990 (D. Mass. 1851) (No. 16,240B). Federal District
Court Judge Andrew G. Miller upheld the slave owner's right under the 1850 statute to seize his
fugitive slave, with or without a warrant, and issued a writ of habeas corpus directed to the sheriff
who held him on a charge of kidnapping and assault and battery for exercising his federal right of
recapture. United States ex rel. Garland v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1318 (D. Wis. 1854) (No. 15,811).
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for leading a mob that stormed a Milwaukee jail and freed an alleged
fugitive slave; and it refused to recognize the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over its decisions. 28 The United States Supreme Court
vehemently asserted its appellate jurisdiction,'29 but the state did not
appear when the appealed cases were argued on their merits.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decisions in a remarkably nationalistic opinion written by Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney which dramatically affirmed the supremacy of
national sovereignty over state sovereignty.130 He asserted that a state is
sovereign only "to a certain extent," for its "sovereignty is limited and
restricted by the Constitution of the United States"'' and by the need for
national uniformity in federal law.' The Court reaffirmed its appellate
jurisdiction over the state's highest court in all federal questions. It also
unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, "in all of its provisions,"'33 in an unequivocal rejection of
Wisconsin's attempted interposition and nullification of federal law.
The Civil War ended the struggle of the Northern states to protect the
personal liberties of alleged runaway slaves from federal efforts to
enforce the constitutional and statutory rights of slaveowners. However,
the constitutional crisis in federalism relating to individual liberty
reemerged after the Civil War. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery in December 1865. Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress
ironically asserted the broad theories of constitutional rights and
congressional power to enforce them developed in cases such as
M'Culloch v. Maryland, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, and the other Fugitive
Slave Clause cases. They therefore interpreted the Thirteenth
Amendment's abolition of slavery as an affirmative guarantee of freedom
and the rights of freemen which delegated to Congress plenary power to
secure the status and enforce the rights of all United States citizens. 34
128. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, aff'd, 3 Wis. 49 (1854) (habeas granted); Exparte Booth, 3 Wis. 145
(1854) (habeas denied while case is within jurisdiction of another court); In re Booth and Rycraft,
3 Wis. 157 (1855) (habeas granted).
129. See United States v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 477 (1855).
130. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
131. Id. at 516.
132. Id. at 518.
133. id. at 526.
134. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J 565, 567-70, 581 (1989)
[hereinafter Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 895-99
(1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism]. For example, Senator Lyman
Trumbull, the principal author of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, introduced the bill to the Senate with
the declaration: "Surely we have the authority to enact a law as efficient in the interest of freedom,
now that freedom prevails throughout the country, as we had in the interest of slavery when it
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Again, ironically, they used the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a model
when they exercised plenary power to enforce the civil rights of
American citizens by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.' The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 36 criminalized certain violations of the civil rights'
the statute conferred on United States citizens, 38 and it conferred primary
civil and criminal jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce these rights
whenever the citizen was unable to enforce them through state law
enforcement institutions.'39 It provided for the judicial appointment of
commissioners and imposed on them and on United States Attorneys,
Marshals, and Deputy Marshals the duty, "at the expense of the United
States, to institute proceedings against all and every person who shall
violate the provisions of this act."' 4° Federal attorneys and marshals who
failed "to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the
provisions of this act" were subject to a fine of up to $1,000 payable to
"the person upon whom the accused is alleged to have committed the
offence."' 4' This section also authorized commissioners "to summon and
call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county,
or such portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the
militia, as may be necessary" to enforce this act and to ensure its "faithful
observance" and that of the Thirteenth Amendment. 42 It also imposed
a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment of up to six months on anyone
convicted of "knowingly and wilfully obstruct[ing], hinder[ing], or
prevent[ing] any officer, or other person" authorized to execute process
under this act
from arresting any person ... or [who] shall rescue or attempt to rescue such
person from the custody of the officer, other person or persons,. .. or shall aid,
abet, or assist any person so arrested as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to
escape from the custody of the officer or other person .... or shall harbor or
prevailed in a portion of the country." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). House floor
manager of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressly cited M'Culloch and Prigg as authority and
declared that "The possession of the rights [of free men] by the citizen raises by implication the
power in Congress to provide appropriate means for their protection; in other words, to supply the
needed remedy." Id. at 1294 (remarks of Rep. Wilson). See also, id. at 1118 (remarks of Rep.
Wilson); id. at 1836 (remarks of Rep. Williams).
135. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
136. Id. See also Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 133, at 599-90; Robert J.
Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War,
92 AMER. HIST. REv. 45, 59 (1987) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew].
137. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27.
138. See id. at § 1.
139. See id. at § 3.
140. Id. at § 4.
141. Id. at § 5.
142. Id.
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conceal any person who whose arrest a warrant or process shall have been
issued. . ...
It also provided that all fees and other expenses incurred in the execution
of this statute, such as food and lodging for those detained for violating
the statute's provisions, were to be paid out of the United States treasury,
but were made "recoverable from the defendant as part of the judgment
in case of conviction.' 44
This same Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment with the
understanding that it incorporated into the Constitution their interpretation
of the Thirteenth Amendment and the plenary power to enforce citizens'
rights that they had just exercised in enacting the Civil Rights Act under
the Thirteenth Amendment. 14  Indeed, they incorporated section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
enacted more far-reaching civil rights enforcement statutes in 1870,146
which reenacted sections of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and in 1871. 47
However, unlike the framers of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the
framers of these civil rights guarantees consciously sought to preserve
concurrent state jurisdiction over citizens' fundamental rights.'48
The lower federal courts upheld these statutes and affirmed Congress's
theory of its plenary power to secure citizens' rights. 149 With the election
of Ulysses S. Grant to the presidency, all three branches of the national
government were united in protecting citizens' personal liberties from
terrorists' violence. 5 ' In a stunning rejection of this national sovereignty-
based constitutional federalism, the United States Supreme Court quickly
reversed the lower federal courts, rejected Congress's plenary power to
enforce citizens' rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and eliminated most of the legal authority of the Department of Justice
to protect citizens' fundamental rights.'
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TRAGIC IRONY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
In asserting a state sovereignty theory of federalism after the Civil
War, the Supreme Court rejected the national sovereignty theory of
federalism characteristic of the Court before the Civil War. It substituted
the Court's earlier conception of the Founders' Constitution as a power-
enhancing document with one of a power-limiting document. It
substituted a clause-bound literal textual interpretation of the Constitution
for the Court's earlier theories of implied inherent power and implied
enumerated power. The Court engrafted onto the Fourteenth Amendment
a state action limitation that defeated the Framers' understanding of the
Amendment as a plenary guarantee of citizens' fundamental rights.
Although the Court glanced at the political practice of the Reconstruction
Congresses in interpreting the effect of their actions on the Constitution,
it rejected the Framers' constitutional theory for its textual literalism and
eliminated significant aspects of the changes the Reconstruction
Congresses made on American federalism. Therefore, when today's state
sovereignty plurality applies its state sovereignty theory of constitutional
federalism, it is not enforcing the Founders' First Principles. Rather, it
is applying the late nineteenth century Supreme Court's rejection of the
Founders' Constitution and the Framers' understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
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